Now, before I continue with this line of thought, let me state that the conclusion of your argument, if I am not mistaken, is:

Since God is omnipotent he should be able to prevent the results of evil action by intervening and still allow the occurring cause.

Let assume that that conclusion were possible, and if it were the question that arises is: would the existence of (1G) and (2G) exist if results of evil actions, which brings about (1E) and (2E), were to be eliminated?
The cases (1G) and (2G) are logically made possible by the existence of (1E) and (2E); this is analogous for hot and could or any other counter-dependant. So if God even so much as limits any action or result that is caused, or that will bring about (1E) then he must allow that (1G) not exist. The same follows for (2E)–>(2G). Thus, God cannot result of any evil event without eliminating goods.

Your claim that God ’should’ intercede to stop evil actions from occurring is still an argument from ignorance. Why should he? What reasons would God have to bring that about? Is it because it would be better that the actions of men be determined moderately? Can you provide a reason for why?
However, that is beside that point let us move on to why your conclusion is erred when discussing freedom and causes.

It is actually a very simple concept. Alvin Plantinga in “God, Freedom and Evil” addresses that exact claim, and refutes it. That is why the atheologian is no longer attacking that concept but rather the existence of natural evil or unnecessary evil.

Plantinga states that if God is to make one refrain from bringing about the result of their action then that person is not truly free. Thus God is determining the actions of free agents. If God determines the actions of some free agents then the parts of the whole are not free. Thus logically the whole itself is not free. (This seems to be derived from the logical concept Axiom 5)
To further the idea of Plantinga and Nelson Pike, I assert that if God were to limit evil by divinely interceding, then he would also have to not only limit the result but the cause that is bringing about any evil result because actions that bring about evil are evil themselves, he would therefore have to stop any evil action (I say any because God could not merely chose to limit certain evils and allow others and remain omni benevolent. Thus, if god is to limit any result he must limit all results in ore to remain wholly good).

You have not correctly thought out the causal events that would proceed if God were to limit all evil result. If he were to do so would moral evil exist? The answerer is no. And we know that it is logically impossible to actualize a world containing morally free agents without the existence of moral evil (see: Alvin Plantinga “God, Freedom and Evil”).

I’m having a hard time following your arguments. I’d like to be charitable and assume you have valid points to make and I’m just not getting it. Could you help me understand what you are saying?

First, you say that I’m committing a naturalistic fallacy. It would help me if you would explain what you mean by that, since, esp. on the web, terms can have different meanings to different people. Are you referring to the is-ought distinction, or are you saying that just because saving a child is the “natural” thing that we would do doesn’t mean that action is “good” (and thus what we should expect of God)?

Second, you say that I’m am “ignor[ing] causal laws associated with free will.” What causal laws exactly am I ignoring? Please state them simply and directly. Perhaps you’re referring to your subsequent discussion of Alvin Plantinga and free will. I’ll come to that in a moment.

Third, you accuse my thought experiment of being an Argument from Ignorance. I’m not sure what to make of that. When it comes to the (purported) ineffable Source of all creation, we can all reasonable plead ignorance. Should I say nothing then? This charge seems ready made to silence any argument about God you don’t like. Discussing God as if He were an agent who could potentially intervene in the real world is conventional and unremarkable. Nor is it remarkable to take God as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. And that last term, “omnibenevolent,” means that we are taking as a given that God is good and a moral agent. It looks like you are faulting my argument for not providing evidence that God is good and should intervene — a strange way for you to defend God, it that’s your intent. Perhaps I’ve misunderstood you.

Finally, you appeal to Alvin Plantinga and give a simplified proof for why evil cannot be stopped. First off, I’m not sure you’re proof is well formed. You state that it is a proof of why evil cannot be stopped if we are to be truly free. Yet, as you’ve written it, it instead concludes that “causal initiators” are not free. You seem to have left some steps out.

Also, I see no reason to accept your first premise that “[i]f God limits or prevents the result of a cause, he must prevent the occurrence of the cause itself.” We can limit or prevent a result without preventing the cause. We just have to interpose our own action[s] into the chain of causation so as to avoid the result we wish to stop.

For example, say we want to prevent the eight ball from falling into the corner pocket in a game of billiards. The imminent cause of the eight ball falling in the corner pocket is that my friend Paul is about to strike the cue ball with his cue stick. I could knock him down first, thus preventing the result (eight ball sunk) by preventing the cause (Paul strikes the cue ball). Or, I could hold my cue stick across the table between the cue ball and the eight ball, such that the cue ball cannot strike the eight ball. Or I could pluck the cue ball off the table (as it rushes toward the eight ball) and chuck it in the trash. In any case, I’ve prevented the result without preventing the cause, Paul (in the sense of the “causal initiator”).

So right there your proof has run aground before even getting away from the dock. Perhaps now you would like to take the problem of evil seriously.

1. If God limits or prevents the result of a cause, he must prevent the occurrence of the cause itself.
2. If god prevents the occurrence of a cause, then he must limit the causal initiator ‘CI’ (Agents).
3. To limit the CI, God must limit the ability of the CI to initiate or act, so that the cause cannot occur.
4. Therefore, the CI (to be limited) is not truly free.

Any event weather you make an agent sleep, turn his bullets into sunflowers, or cause him to not think about the action before he decides to do it, is limiting the ability to bring to pass a free desire or willed action. It thus follows that to limit evil even at the slightest eliminates the true concept of free will.
Best,
John

Now you’ve gone and done it! You’ve suprised me. I look forward to reading what you come up with.